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ABSTRACT
The United States is often taken to be the exemplar of the benefits of a monetary union. Since
1788 Americans, with the exception of the Civil War years, have been able to buy and sell goods,
travel, and invest within a vast area without ever having to be concerned about changes in exchange
rates. But there was also a recurring cost. A shock, typically in financial or agricultural markets,
would hit one region particularly hard. The banking system in that region would lose reserves
producing a monetary contraction that would aggravate the effects of the initial disturbance. Plots
of bank deposits by region show these patterns clearly. Often, an interregional debate over monetary
institutions would follow. The uncertainty created by the debate would further aggravate the
contraction. During these episodes the United States might well have been better off if each region
had had its own currency: changes in exchange rates could have secured equilibrium in interregional
payments while monetary policy was directed toward internal stability.  It is far from clear, to put
it differently, that the United States was an optimal currency area. This pattern held until the 1930s
when institutional changes, such as increased federal fiscal transfers (which pumped high-powered
money into regions that were losing reserves) and bank deposit insurance, addressed the problem of
regional banking shocks. Political considerations, of course, ruled out separate regional currencies
in the United States. But thinking about U.S. monetary history in this way clarifies the nature of the










I. The Troubled History of the American Monetary Union 
 
The U.S. monetary union began with the ratification of the Constitution in 
1788. It has remained intact, with the exception of the Civil War years, ever since. 
And the United States has grown and prospered during that time. But it does not 
follow that the United States has grown and prospered because it has had a monetary 
union. The benefits of the monetary union – the relative ease with which interregional 
movements of capital, labor, and final products could take place – are evident. The 
costs of the monetary union, that I intend to focus upon here, are less evident, but 
nonetheless important.  
Throughout the first 150 years of the U.S. monetary union, at least, the United 
States was wracked repeatedly by bitter regional disputes over monetary policies and 
institutions. On more than one occasion, those disputes contributed to uncertainty 
about the future of policies and institutions that exacerbated economic disturbances, 
and contributed to mistakes in national monetary policy. Regional disputes over 
monetary policy arose because of real differences in regional interests: What was 
good monetary policy from the point of view of one region, was sometimes bad policy 
from the point of view of another. The most bitter disputes arose when adverse 
monetary reactions occurred in a region already suffering from a real shock. A decline 
in the demand for agricultural products, for example, would depress incomes, leading 
in turn to a round of bank failures and bank runs, and declining regional money 
supplies, that reinforced the effect of the initial shock. In short, an economic historian  4 
who is looking for illustrations of the cost of relinquishing monetary autonomy can 
find them in abundance in the monetary history of the United States.  
Before turning to the history, however, I want to briefly summarize the theory 
of optimum currency areas to provide the necessary background for the remainder of 
the paper. 
 
II. The Theory of Optimal Currency Areas 
 
The optimum currency area hypothesis grew out of the debate over fixed vs. 
flexible exchange rates. Milton Friedman (1953), Leland Yeager (1959), and others 
had argued that a country could be better off by allowing its currency to float, and 
reserving domestic monetary policy for price or employment stability. The advocates 
of flexible exchange rates had recognized that a country could be too small to profit 
from flexible rates. But it was Robert Mundell, who first used the term “Optimum 
Currency Area” in a famous paper published in 1961, who clarified the circumstances 
under which a region or country would benefit from joining a monetary union.1 On 
the one hand, Mundell argued, there were advantages for a region that joined a 
monetary union derived from minimizing transaction costs. On the other hand there 
were disadvantages derived from giving up the exchange rate, and changes in the 
stock of money, as policy tools. Whether a particular region constituted an optimal 
currency area or whether it would be better off as part of a larger monetary union 
depended on the net sum of these costs and benefits.  
                                                       
1 Other important early contributions were McKinnon (1963), Kennen (1969), and Tower and Willet 
(1976). Kawai (1992) provides a clear summary.  5 
The benefits of a larger monetary union are usually fairly easy to see, although 
measuring them can be difficult. People can travel to one part of the country to 
another without having to convert their money; prices of products sold in distant 
regions can be compared without having to search for information or perform 
calculations, and interregional investments can be made without the risk of currency 
fluctuations.  
The costs of joining a monetary union are less obvious, and will depend on a 
number of factors. Consider first, the case in which economic activity is distributed 
randomly throughout the monetary union. Then the monetary authority need pay little 
attention to regions. What is optimal for one part of the country will be optimal for 
another. But suppose that the monetary union is divided into two regions, say East 
and West, that specialize in producing different goods, say steel and wheat. Now it is 
possible for there to be significant shifts in demand between the regions. The demand 
for steel might go up, while the demand for wheat is going down. To use the modern 
jargon, the country might be subject to asymmetric shocks. The West will run a 
balance of payments deficit with the East. Reserves will flow from West to East, and 
the stock of money in the West will fall, aggravating the recession caused by the 
decline in the demand for wheat. The stock of money in the East will rise, adding to 
the boom caused by the increase in the demand for steel.  It is no longer clear that 
what is good for one region is good for all. The West might be better off with a 
national monetary policy that aimed to restore full employment, while the East might 
want a policy directed toward price stability.   6 
If labor and capital are mobile across regions, then the impact of asymmetric 
shocks will be limited. Labor, for example, will respond to the shift in demand by 
moving from West to East, from wheat production and into steel production. The 
monetary authority will be able to neglect the problem of unemployment and focus on 
price stability. But now suppose that barriers to labor and capital mobility exist 
among regions, and assume further that monetary policy can affect real magnitudes in 
the short-run, say because certain prices or wages are sticky. Then the monetary 
authority faces a real dilemma. If the monetary authority follows a policy consistent 
with price stability in the East, it might aggravate the recession in the West; if it tilts 
full against the recession in the West, it might produce inflation in the East. 
The East and West, to put it slightly differently, would be better off with 
separate currencies, and floating or at least adjustable rates between them. When 
demand shifted from the West to the East, the western currency would depreciate, 
mitigating the effects of the decline in demand. Meanwhile the monetary authority in 
the East could follow a policy aimed at price stability.  
  This is essentially the theory as originally developed by Mundell. The story 
depends on imperfections in capital and labor markets, and price and wage stickiness. 
As we move from the world of  Keynesian or classic Monetarist economics, where 
monetary policy has important short-run effects, to assumptions of perfect labor and 
capital mobility and ineffective monetary policy, the case for subdividing economic 
regions into separate currency areas weakens. Nevertheless, as a number of writers 
have argued, a case for separate currencies may remain (Willett and Wihlborg, 1999). 
For example, even if all factor markets cleared, a separate currency area could be  7 
justified if non-optimal policies were being followed outside the area. A flexible 
exchange rate then would prevent the importation of non-optimal price level 
movements. In any case, I believe, as I will try to show below, that American 
monetary history offers important examples of regional monetary trends exacerbating 
the effects of asymmetric real shocks. Before turning to those examples, however, I 
want to briefly recount the origins of the American monetary union and the regional 




  Prior to the Revolution the currency of the United States varied from colony to 
colony. The British pound, and other forms of hard currency such as the Spanish peso 
were accepted everywhere. But individual colonies also tried to make their own paper 
currencies legal tenders in order to provide revenues or to aid debtors. Under the 
Articles of Confederation (during the interregnum between the end of the Revolution 
and the Constitution) opinion, especially among the politically sophisticated, turned 
against paper money. The constitution prohibited the states from issuing “bills of 
credit” (paper money) and gave to Congress the exclusive right to “coin money” and 
“establish the value thereof,” thus creating a monetary union based on specie.  
Part of the opposition to paper money was based on the experience of the very 
high rates of inflation under the fiat paper money regime of the Revolution. Tom 
Paine, for example, went from being an advocate of paper money to an opponent 
(Schweitzer 1989, p. 315) after witnessing the Revolutionary inflation.  Opposition to 
paper money was increased by the development of fractional reserve banking, and the  8 
hope that bank notes would provide the convenience of government issued paper 
without the risk of overissue.  
There was also an important regional dimension to the opposition to state 
issued paper money. Rapid deflation after the Revolution had left farmers with heavy 
debt burdens. In the western counties of many states, where agriculture predominated, 
demands for debt and tax relief became insistent. States attempted to handle the 
problem in various ways. Some, such as Massachusetts, followed a get-tough policy 
with farmers who refused to pay. In many of these states farmers took up arms. The 
most serious outbreak of violence was in Massachusetts where Shays’ Rebellion was 
crushed in 1787. Other states, such as Rhode Island, tried to help farmers by issuing 
legal-tender paper money and insisting that creditors accept it, even if they were 
residents of other states. While such policies pacified western farmers, they increased 
tensions among the states. It is conceivable that interstate tensions, such as those that 
arose between Rhode Island and its neighbors, could have been resolved by a clause 
in the Constitution requiring states to keep their currencies at par. But this would still 
leave room for some states to increase their seignorage by expanding their currencies 
and allowing them to circulate outside their own borders. Thus, a monetary union was 
viewed as a necessary prerequisite for a political union (Rolnick, Smith, and Weber, 
1993). 
The Constitution appeared to settle the debate between those states that would 
have used monetary policy to help western farmers and those that would not. But the 
issue reemerged in the debates over the First and Second Banks of the United States. 
The First Bank of the United States was chartered in 1791. It was part of Alexander  9 
Hamilton’s plan for reorganizing the finances of the new government. Modeled to 
some extent on the Bank of England, it was intended to be a large bank, with a 
national branching system, that would help manage the new government’s finances, 
and issue a paper money of uniform value (in part because it would be a legal tender) 
in all parts of the country. The term of the charter was limited to twenty years. When 
the charter came up for renewal in 1811 there was substantial opposition. Most of the 
opposition to the Bank, at least measured by the formal arguments against it, centered 
on the constitutionality of the Bank. The upshot was that the attempt to renew the 
charter failed, and the Bank was forced to wind up its affairs. 
The monetary disturbances associated with the War of 1812 revived interest in 
a national bank. Such a bank, it was hoped, would pressure state banks into 
contracting their note issues and resuming specie payments. The Second Bank of the 
United States was established in 1816, again with a charter limited to twenty years. 
The Second Bank was similar to the First, but its capital was larger.  
Although financial historians have often written favorably about the Second 
Bank, its career ended disastrously in the famous “Bank War.”  The Bank War pitted 
the Second Bank, led by its President, the aristocratic Philadelphian Nicholas Biddle, 
against an opposition led by the first President from West of the Alleghenies, Andrew 
Jackson. Not all eastern politicians sided with Biddle and the Bank. In New York, in 
particular, it was hoped that the Second Bank of the United States would be replaced 
by a Third Bank of the United States with headquarters in New York City rather than 
Philadelphia. And not all western politicians supported Jackson. Davy Crockett, a 
Congressman who represented poor farmers from western Tennessee (and King of the  10 
Wild Frontier!), supported the Bank. (Shackford, 1986, passim).
2  In general, 
however, the Bank’s opponents were from the West and its supporters from the East. 
The exact reasons for Jackson’s opposition to the Bank are still a matter of 
dispute. Jackson was first elected in 1828. His outspoken criticism of the Bank began 
soon after, and led to an attempt to renew the Bank’s charter before Jackson came up 
for his second election in 1832. The bill to renew the charter passed both houses of 
Congress, but was vetoed by Jackson. The veto message has been the subject of 
intense scrutiny and debate by historians. Jackson cited a number of reasons for 
vetoing the bill to recharter the Bank: foreigners held a considerable amount of stock 
(although they could not vote, a fact he failed to notice), a competition for the charter 
would produce more revenues for the Treasury, and so on.  
But the interesting point from our perspective is that Jackson stressed that the 
Bank was controlled by Eastern moneyed interests, and had followed policies harmful 
to western farming interests. Jackson’s reasoning on this issue has been faulted. 
(Temin 1969). Nevertheless, it is clear that what Jackson perceived to be a conflict 
between eastern and western monetary interests inspired his opposition to the Bank, 
and galvanized the country. Jackson won an overwhelming reelection, sealing the fate 
of the Bank. Although there would be further battles, the war was lost. The charter of 
the Bank expired in 1836 and it wound up its affairs. In the end the antagonism 
toward the Bank, rooted in Western antagonism toward moneyed interests, had 
produced a momentous change in the monetary institutions of the United States. The 
                                                       
2 It should be noted that although Crockett’s support for the Bank may have been based on general 
considerations, he owed money to the bank, a debt that was partially cancelled through the personal 
intervention of Nicholas Biddle.  11 
United States would not have any institution resembling a central bank until the 
Federal Reserve was established in 1913.  
In 1837 the United States experienced a severe banking panic; numerous 
banks failed, and the banks were forced to suspend specie payments. In 1838 specie 
payments were resumed, and things began to look up. But a second panic in 1839 
inaugurated a long recession marked by falling prices and a contraction in real output, 
although the degree of contraction in real output has been debated. To what extent did 
the Bank War contribute to the Crises of 1837 and 1839 and the subsequent 
recession? Peter Temin (1969) has argued that international forces, largely 
independent of the Bank War, explain the Jacksonian inflation, and the Crises of 1837 
and 1839. Marie Sushka (1976), however, has argued that the Bank War did have an 
impact by increasing uncertainty about the soundness of the monetary system. 
Undoubtedly, independent international shocks are part of the story, perhaps the 
major part.  But it seems probable that the uncertainty about the future of monetary 
arrangements created by the Bank War made holders of bank liabilities more fearful 
about the soundness of the banking system than they otherwise would have been, at 
least in some measure, and contributed through this channel to the banking crises and 
the recession that followed. 
 
IV. Disunion 
  The Civil War was the result, of course, of the great national division over 
slavery. Nevertheless, financial factors did play a small role, influencing, perhaps, the 
timing of the War. Before the War the South had a relatively well developed banking  12 
system, and there is a good deal of evidence for capital market integration (Bodenhorn 
and Rockoff, 1992). Indeed, Southerners were proud of their banking system, and 
their economic system based on “King Cotton.” The Crisis of 1857 was an eye-opener 
in both the South and the North. As southerners saw it, the crisis was largely of 
Yankee making. It started in New York, with the failure of a branch of the Ohio Life 
Insurance and Trust Company, and spread through the rest of the country. In the end 
the South suffered relatively less than did the North. Many radical Southern 
secessionists seized on the evidence provided by the crisis of 1857 to push their case 
that the South would be better off as an independent country with its own economic 
and monetary policies. In the North the newly formed Republican Party tried, with 
some success, to pin the blame for the Crisis on the Democrats. Thus the Crisis had 
the ironic result of strengthening the two factions least willing to compromise on the 
issue of slavery. (Huston, 1987). 
  The war divided the nation into three monetary regions. In the East and 
Middle West a fiat money standard prevailed based on the greenback. In the south, 
another fiat standard held sway based on the Confederate dollar. The Pacific coast, 
however, remained on gold. The southern monetary system, of course, gradually 
collapsed with the Confederacy, and came to an end in 1865. Returning to gold, and 




  After 1865 the South and Northeast were on the same (greenback) monetary 
system. There was no central bank. The supply of high-powered money was largely  13 
determined by the policies of congress and the secretaries of the treasury. Republicans 
dominated. The goal of monetary policy was returning to the prewar price level and 
gold convertibility. These long-cherished goals were achieved on January 1, 1879 
when the United States returned to the gold standard at the prewar parity. Throughout 
this period the policy of resumption faced determined regional opposition. 
Republicans in the Northeast favored resumption; Democrats and their allies in the 
Greenback Party, based in the Middle West and the South opposed resumption and 
favored monetary expansion.  
 
Southern and Western Opposition to Resumption. 
In 1866 Congress passed the Contraction Act, which called for the reduction 
in the amount of greenbacks in circulation, with a view to early resumption of specie 
payments. When a recession ensued, considerable opposition to this policy developed. 
In the 1868 election the currency was a major issue. Western democrats, following a 
now familiar refrain, demanded that Civil War bonds be paid in greenbacks unless the 
law specifically required payment in specie. Ulysses Grant, a financial conservative, 
however, was elected president. In March 1869 Congress voted to pay the Civil War 
debt in coin. Nevertheless, a more gradual approach toward resumption, referred to as 
“growing up to the currency,” was adopted. Roughly speaking, the policy was to 
freeze the stock of high-powered money so that economic growth would produce a 
gradual decline in the price level.  
  Even this policy faced a severe political test. After the Panic of 1873, 
Congress voted for an increase in the stock of greenbacks. Grant vetoed the measure,  14 
triggering formation of the Greenback party – “a combination of middle western 
farmers, small businessmen, and labor intellectuals.” (Merk 1978, p. 445) In 1875 a 
lame duck Republican Congress adopted the Resumption Act which called for specie 
payments to be resumed on January 1, 1879. 
  Opposition to resumption coming from Greenbackers in the South and West, 
and Democrats with Greenback sympathies was fierce. In 1876 the House voted 106-
86 to repeal the Resumption Act, but repeal died in the Senate. In 1877 the House 
again voted for repeal and for measures that would have expanded the stock of 
money. But in the Senate in 1878 a compromise was worked out. The advocates of 
soft money were persuaded to support a limited expansion of the stock of silver 
money provided for in the Bland-Allison Act, and the policy of resumption was kept 
on track. Resumption, as I noted above, was achieved in 1879. But it had been a near 
thing. 
The opponents of resumption could hardly have been expected to give up their 
cause simply because it produced uncertainty about the final outcome. Nevertheless, 
by repeatedly placing resumption in doubt, the soft money faction created uncertainty 
about future exchange rates, that affected nominal interest rates, and that probably 
created an additional hindrance to international capital flows. (Calomiris 1994). 
During this period, it should be noted, the West remained on the gold 
standard. Indeed, in 1873 the National Banking Act was amended to permit banks in 
California to issue currency redeemable in gold (yellowbacks). Thus from 1865 to 
1879, when the greenback currency became convertible into gold we have a monetary 
rarity: a strong political union, untouched by war, with two currencies, greenbacks  15 
and yellowbacks, circulating at a floating exchange rate. Interest rates on the Pacific 
Coast were high, perhaps reflecting some of the exchange rate uncertainty. Rates, 
however, had been high before the war and would remain high after resumption. In 
any case, the “need” to reunite the currency, as contemporary observers saw it, 
strengthened the case for resumption. 
 
VII  Misunion? 
 
  Middle Western opposition to the gold standard continued to smolder after 
Resumption. In the late 1880s opposition burst into flame once more. The main 
problem was farmer unrest aggravated by low farm prices. Table 1 shows prices for 
the crops that were key in the regions where discontent was at a maximum. The real 
price of wheat had fallen from 100 at the time of resumption to 86 in 1890. Farmer 
Alliances were formed, and showed surprising strength in the 1890 congressional 
elections. Eight Middle Western and one Southern Populists were elected. 
  Congress took note of the growing pressure for inflation and passed the 
Sherman Silver Purchase Act in 1890 which required the Treasury to purchase 4.5 
million ounces of silver per month, virtually the entire U.S. output, paying with new 
legal tender currency redeemable in gold or silver at the discretion of the Treasury. 
The Silver Purchase Act was a compromise, designed to appease southern and 
western inflationists, and western silver interests, without going all the way to the free 
coinage of silver-backed currency. Fear of silver, however, produced a reduction in 
the Treasury’s stock of gold, further increasing fears that the United States might 
abandon the gold standard.  16 
  Although Farm prices rose briefly in 1891, they tumbled again in 1892, and 
demands for monetary expansion were renewed. In 1892 the Northern Alliances 
entered the presidential race as the Populist Party. Their platform, the Omaha 
platform, was a wish list of radical reforms, monetary reforms prominent among 
them.  
  The stage was now set for the Great Depression of the 1890s, and the 
accompanying “Battle of the Standards” (gold vs. silver), the famous debate over 
monetary policy fought along regional lines. Before describing those events, however, 
I want to digress briefly and consider the extent to which those regions matched the 
criteria for optimal currency areas. 
 
A Digression on the Optimal Currency Area Criteria 
 
  Were the regions that opposed resumption in the 1870s, and that supported 
greenbacks and bimetallism in subsequent decades, separately optimal currency 
areas? 
  Optimal-currency-area theorists have described several factors that identify an 
area as a candidate for its own currency: (1) it must be a large area, (2) it must be 
specialized in the production of certain goods and subject to asymmetric shocks, (3) 
labor mobility between the candidate region and other regions is limited, (4) capital 
mobility between the candidate region and other regions is limited, and (5) fiscal 
transfers between the candidate region and other regions are limited.  If the regional 
economies of the United States were relatively small, then the case for viewing them 
as candidates for separate currencies would be off to a bad start. It would be hard to  17 
make a case, for example, for a single state as an optimal currency area. The costs of 
currency conversion mount for a small open economy. But, in fact, the major census 
divisions of the United States were, by world standards, large economies. By 1900, 
for example, U.S. national income was about twice that of Britain. (Friedman and 
Schwartz, 1982, pp. 122, 130). Estimates of the distribution of personal incomes in 
the United States place the share of the Middle Atlantic region (economically the 
largest) at about 31 percent. So a back-of-the-envelope calculation might put the 
income of this region at 62 percent of Britain’s. 
  These regions were subject, moreover, to asymmetric shocks. Regional 
agricultural specialization had begun in the colonial era. The famous “North Thesis” 
(North 1961) maintains that the specialization of the South in plantation agriculture, 
especially cotton, was the driving force behind American economic growth before the 
Civil War. After the Civil War the South remained a land specialized in the 
production of cash crops: sugar, tobacco, rice, and cotton. Indeed, because of the 
changes in the structure of Southern agriculture, the South produced more cotton after 
the Civil War, and devoted a larger share of its resources to the production of cotton, 
than it had before the war. The prices of cash crops rose and fell with the business 
cycle, but seemed to be especially hard hit in certain periods. 
    In terms of labor mobility the South was clearly a world apart until World War 
II. Gavin Wright (1996) in Old South, New South, has shown that while considerable 
integration was achieved across labor markets within the South (wages for unskilled 
white and black workers were almost the same) the southern labor market remained a 
separate low-wage market. Racism limited mobility. Black southerners, of course,  18 
suffered the most; but even white southerners had to overcome stereotypes and  ill 
will, especially after the Civil War. Once migration patterns were established, 
moreover, it was hard to change them in response to changing economic conditions, 
because earlier migrants provided information and support for later migrants. 
Mobility among other regions was much higher. But moving in response to regional 
shocks was even into the 1930s a process accomplished with considerable difficulties. 
The Joads were doing the right thing from an economic point of view – moving from 
a depressed region to an expanding region during the 1930s – but the Grapes of Wrath 
is an appropriate title. 
  The extent of capital mobility is more debatable. The standard view is that 
integration of regional capital markets was not achieved until the turn of the century 
because of a simple reluctance of capital to migrate, or because of institutional factors 
such as differences in banking and usury laws. Indeed, Bodenhorn’s (1995) data 
shows that substantial interregional interest rate differentials persisted through the 
1930s, although Bodenhorn attributes these differences to risk. One can say that after 
1900, if not before, capital market integration served to ameliorate the affects of 
regional shocks.  
In the United States today fiscal transfers tend to offset asymmetric shocks. 
Unemployment benefits, for example, will rise in regions suffering from high 
unemployment. In the nineteenth century, however, the federal government was 
simply too small a share of GDP to offset regional shocks through fiscal transfers. 
The largest federal transfer program by far was the Civil War pension program. And 
this program was somewhat responsive to economic conditions. The depression of the  19 
1890s contributed in some measure to the expansion of benefits under the program 
that occurred at that time. But southerners, immigrants, men who were too old or too 
young to have served, or who hired substitutes were not eligible. Women had to marry 
to become eligible. It was not until the adoption of programs such as unemployment 
compensation and agricultural price supports in the 1930s that one can point to fiscal 
transfers as a legitimate mechanism for overcoming asymmetric shocks. 
The apriori case for believing that prices and wages in the separate regions 
were relatively sticky (thus strengthening the case for an independent monetary 
policy) appears to be relatively weak. The labor unions or oligopolistic industries that 
economists often point to as sources of stickiness were unimportant. There was 
considerable political agitation about the danger of the Trusts, but how much they 
contributed to price rigidity is debatable. In the South, even a significant portion of 
agricultural rental contracts was indexed: the famous sharecropping contracts.  
Nevertheless, there were elements of institutional rigidity: taxes, mortgages, 
cash rentals, and so on. And beyond purely institutional sources of rigidity, there were 
the usual coordination problems. Adjusting to lower world prices for agricultural 
products meant a coordinated fall in wages, prices, and rents. Along most dimensions 
(labor and capital mobility, and fiscal transfers) the monetary union was strengthened 
during the 1930s. But along this dimension, the union was weakened. 
Certain regions of the United States clearly exhibited many of the signs of 
good candidates for separate currencies, at least until the 1930s. But can one identify 
episodes in which substantial costs were imposed on these regions because they were 
part of a monetary union?  Classic cases of optimal-currency-area dilemmas, a boom  20 
in one region combined with a recession in other regions, were probably rare. More 
common were differences among regions in the magnitude of cyclical fluctuations, 
and in the timing of contractions and recoveries.  
 
The Great Depression of the 1890s 
  The Great Depression of the 1890s, like the Depression of the 1930s, involved 
two severe recessions in close order. The economy declined for 17 months from 
January of 1893 to June 1894, and then after a comparatively weak recovery, declined 
again for 18 months from December 1895 to June 1897. Unemployment figures are 
necessarily somewhat problematic, but the figures we do have show the rate of 
unemployment at double-digit levels from 1893 through 1898, with a peak of 18.4 
percent in 1894. (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1975, p. 135) 
  As we noted above, the early 1890s were characterized by concern over the 
maintenance of the gold standard stemming from the Sherman Silver Purchase Act, 
the decline in the stock of Treasury gold, and the rise of the Populists. In May 1893 a 
banking panic was touched off by commercial failures in New York. In June 1893, the 
administration revealed that it would press for the repeal of the Sherman Silver 
Purchase Act, and this seemed to ease pressures in financial markets. In July, 
however, further commercial and bank failures, led to a renewal of the panic. Bank 
runs and failures occurred in all regions. Starting in New York, banks throughout the 
country restricted the convertibility of notes and deposits into gold. The restriction on 
convertibility somewhat eased the situation. High interest rates drew gold into the 
United States and specie payments were resumed in September.  21 
  But the next three years were characterized by continued difficulties. Populists 
in the West and South continued to agitate for free and unlimited coinage of silver at a 
bimetallic ratio of 16:1. It was widely believed that adoption of bimetallism at that 
rate would have created substantial inflation and driven the United States off the gold 
standard. Uncertainty about the standard was reflected in higher interest rates. The 
Republicans favored continued commitment to the gold standard, although some 
Republicans, typically from the western states, called for an international conference 
aimed at restoring bimetallism, but at a bimetallic ratio that would permit continued 
circulation of both metals, and that would not produce inflation. The Democrats were 
badly split. The eastern wing of the party, led by former President Grover Cleveland, 
favored maintaining the commitment to gold; the western and southern wings favored 
bimetallism at 16:1. At the Democratic National Convention held in Chicago in 1896, 
the Westerners overthrew the Easterners. William Jennings Bryan, a Democratic 
Congressman from Nebraska with strong Populist sympathies, was nominated after a 
stirring speech, one of the most famous in American history, in which he declared that 
the Republicans would not be allowed to “Crucify Mankind upon a Cross of Gold.” 
  Despite his oratorical skills, Bryan lost the election to William McKinley, who 
favored the Republican brand of international bimetallism. Bryan carried states only 
in the West and South. Ironically, new flows of gold soon began to reverse the 
deflation that had persisted since the end of the Civil War. Demands for inflation 
through bimetallism or fiat paper became superfluous. The United States formalized 
its commitment to the gold standard with the Gold Standard Act of 1900.   22 
Why was the United States so badly split along regional lines over monetary 
policy? Historians, traditionally, have seen the issue as one of creditors (eastern 
bankers) against debtor (western farmers). One problem with this view, as was 
recognized by Bryan and others at the time, is that any help from inflation would 
likely be partial and temporary, because interest rates would rise to reflect expected 
inflation. Frieden’s (1997) recent argument that the support for 16:1 came primarily 
from exporters who looked to devaluation to improve earnings seems more 
persuasive. 
As we saw above, however, the regions at odds with each other were, in many 
ways, separable currency areas. It makes sense to look at regional stocks of money, or 
what in fact are available, regional deposits. Figure 1 shows deposits by region from 
1875 through 1896. Deposits in each region were set to 100 in 1875 to make it easier 
to compare regional trends.
3 Granted, regional deposits reflected as well as caused 
changes in regional economic activity. Nevertheless, to the extent that these deposit 
movements reflected interregional transfers of reserves (balance of payments 
problems) or bank failures that might have been prevented by lender of last resort 
operations, they represent an independent influence on economic activity.  
In any case, the picture is rather dramatic. The Great Depression of the 1890s 
left only a small imprint on deposits in New England or the Middle Atlantic region 
(dominated by New York and Pennsylvania). In New England deposits fell 2.4 
percent from 1892 to 1893, but then more than regained their loss, rising 7.2 percent 
from 1893 to 1894. In the Middle Atlantic region, deposits fell 4.7 percent, and then  23 
rose 7.7 percent.  On the other hand, the impact on deposits in the West and South, 
the centers of the Populist revolt, were dramatic. Deposits in the South fell 18.6 
percent from 1892 to 1893 and regained only 8.2 percent between 1893 and 1894; in 
the West deposits fell 16.4 percent, and only recovered .4 percent. Deposits in both 
regions were lower in 1896 than they had been in 1892. Is it any wonder that 
politicians in the West and South were calling for measures  to increase the stock of 
money (remonetization of silver, or more radically, agricultural price supports 
financed by issues of fiat money) and that politicians in New England and the Middle 
Atlantic States called for a stand pat policy?  
Data for all banks (both national and non-national) is available during this 
period only for four regions. The Middle Western and Pacific regions were aggregated 
in the source for non-national banks. This is worrisome because the Pacific Coast 
(which is dominated by California) was growing rapidly. Deposits in this region 
might have followed a somewhat different path than in other western states. In 
addition, the figures on non-national banks may be subject to reporting errors that 
vary in magnitude across regions and over time, despite the painstaking work 
undertaken by David Fand (1954) in putting these figures together. I have, however, 
computed National Bank deposits, which are likely to be more accurate, for five 
regions, separating the Middle West and the Far West.  
These estimates are plotted in Figure 2. Again, the deposits in each region 
have been set to 100 in 1875. As expected, national bank deposits grew extremely 
rapidly on the Pacific Coast, rising by a factor of 18 between 1875 and 1900. The 
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most important point, however, is that the crisis of the 1893 is most evident in three 
regions: the Pacific Coast and Territories, the West, and the South. Again, the Middle 
Atlantic region and New England record only small impacts from the Crisis of 1893. 
  Who was right, the East or the West? I find it hard not to believe that the 
falling stocks of deposits and bank credit in the South and West did not contribute in 
some measure to the economic distress those regions were suffering, and would not 
have been relieved by monetary expansion. Taking a longer-term view, Milton 
Friedman (Fall 1990, and December 1990) has argued that adoption of bimetallism 
earlier in the postbellum period would have produced a more satisfactory behavior of 
the price level. He concludes, however, that by 1896 the time for adopting 
bimetallism had passed.  
In any case, one thing seems clear. An unequivocal commitment to either gold 
or bimetallism would have avoided the uncertainty which itself was part of the 
problem. Milton Friedman and Anna J. Schwartz put it this way, in A Monetary 
History (1963, p. 134) 
In retrospect, it seems clear that either acceptance of a silver standard 
at an early stage, or an early commitment to gold would have been 
preferable to the uneasy compromise that was maintained, with the 
uncertainty about the final outcome and the consequent wide 
fluctuations to which the currency was subjected. 
 
Politicians, as Figures 1 and 2 show, were advocating the real interests of their 
own regions. Deposit growth in the East, although affected by the panic of 1893, was 
sufficiently close to trend to justify sticking with the current monetary policy; deposit 
growth in the South and West was depressed and justified a change in policy.   25 
The optimal solution, were it politically feasible, might have been separate 
currencies, say for the East, the West, the South, and the Pacific Coast. The West and 
the South would have adopted a silver standard in the 1890s, while the East and the 
Pacific Coast, given its historical attachments, would have stayed on gold. Money 
stocks would not have fallen in the West and the South as much as they did. Their 
currencies, moreover, would have depreciated against gold, making it easier to 
dispose of wheat, cotton, and other agricultural products on domestic and word 
markets. The debate over monetary policy, and the resulting uncertainty, which 
affected banks in all regions would not have happened.  
 
The Panic of 1903 (the Rich Man’s Panic) and the Panic of 1907 
  Figure 3 plots deposits by region for the period 1900 to 1914.
4 Deposits in 
each region have been set equal to 100 in 1900. The major events during this period 
were the panic of 1903 (the Rich Man’s Panic) and the Panic of 1907. Here the 
regional pattern is different from the 1890s.  
  New York financial markets came under severe stress in late 1902. Short-
term interest rates shot up, the stock market crashed, and a number of financial houses 
went bankrupt. The associated cyclical contraction was relatively long (23 months), 
from September 1902 to August 1904.  In the Rich Man’s panic the biggest impact 
was on the Middle Atlantic (New York) region, although even in this region the panic 
shows up as a period of relatively slow growth in deposits, rather than as an actual 
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decline. Deposits in the other regions, by way of contrast, were not affected much at 
all.  
Although a severe jolt, the Rich Man’s panic did not produce a banking panic 
or a severe economic contraction. The Panic of 1907, however, produced a much 
broader and deeper reaction in the banking system. Pressure began to build in the 
New York money market in the summer and fall of 1907. A major shock occurred in 
October 1907 when a run on the Knickerbocker Trust Company forced it to suspend 
payments.
5  Other Trust companies soon were in difficulty as well. A banking panic 
soon gripped the nation, and the banks were forced to restrict the convertibility of 
bank notes and deposits into gold. 
Nearly all regions of the country were affected. Only the plot of deposits for 
New England fails to show a dramatic imprint from the crisis. But as in 1903, the 
interesting feature of the data is the impact on the Middle Atlantic States, and the 
contrast between those states and the Middle West. Deposits in the Middle Atlantic 
States fell 2.38 percent between 1907 and 1908. Deposits in the South and on the 
Pacific coast fell by even larger amounts. But deposits in the Middle West fell by only 
1.99 percent. The regional impact of the panic of 1907 was clearly very different from 
the impact of the panic of 1893. 
  As might be expected the political response to the crises in 1903 and 1907 was 
also very different than it was in the 1890s. During the 1890s, the eastern 
establishment was convinced that monetary reform was a foolish idea pushed by  27 
dangerous Mid-western radicals such as Bryan; now the East was convinced that 
monetary reform was a wise idea advocated by the best scientific minds. In the wake 
of the Panic of 1907 the Aldrich-Vreeland Act (May 1908) was passed which created 
an emergency currency that could be issued during panics; and created the National 
Monetary Commission to investigate the monetary system, and recommend reforms. 
Senator Nelson W. Aldrich of Rhode Island, a long time Republican leader, and 
determined opponent of the Populists, headed the Commission. The main 
recommendation was the creation of a type of central bank. The United States would 
be divided into districts, and the banks in each district would keep their reserves in a 
district bank that was owned and controlled by the member banks. There would be a 
central board, controlled by the district banks, with the power to issue a gold-backed 
currency. Aldrich introduced a bill in Congress embodying this plan.  
By the time that the bill came up for debate, however, the Democrats 
controlled the Congress and the Presidency. Goaded by the populists among them, the 
Democrats insisted on changes in the bill. Indeed, William Jennings Bryan, who 
carried Populist hopes for free silver in 1896, was then Secretary of State, and is said 
to have played an important role in the negotiations. The final result was legislation 
that differed from the Republican model in two ways, one that would remain 
important, and one that would not. First, the new institution was to be run by people 
appointed by the Federal Government, and not by the banks. Second, the right to issue 
currency would be the responsibility of the district banks, rather than the central 
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strict asset regulations imposed by the Comptroller of the Currency and the New York  28 
board. The ability of the District banks to issue their own currencies would not prove 
to be a major feature of the system, it reflected a Populist hankering for a monetary 
system that would respond to the differing needs of differing regions. 
 
The Great Depression of the 1930s 
  The Great Depression of the 1930s was the most severe in American 
economic history. Ever since the publication of A Monetary History of the United 
States, Friedman and Schwartz (1963), changes in the stock of money, and mistakes 
in monetary policy, have been granted an important role in the economic historian’s 
account of the Depression. The extraordinary impact of the Depression can be seen in 
Figure 4, which plots all bank deposits by Federal Reserve District from 1922 to 
1941. I have switched from broader regions to Federal Reserve districts, primarily 
because data for the Federal Reserve districts is readily available. Nevertheless, the 
Federal Reserve districts correspond, roughly, to economic regions, so little is lost in 
switching from broader regions to Federal Reserve districts. To make the figure easier 
to read, deposits in each region have been set to 100 in 1929.
6   
No region was immune to the crisis, but there were significant regional 
differences. Within the whole period I have highlighted two subperiods, 1929-1931 
and 1934 to 1936, when there were marked regional differences in the rate of change 
of deposits, and when important mistakes were made in monetary policy. 
  The most famous, and probably the most important, error in American 
monetary history was the failure of the Federal Reserve to act as lender of last resort 
                                                                                                                                                       
banking authority.  29 
for the banking system during the contraction from 1929 to 1933. A great deal has 
been written about the reasons for the failure of the Federal Reserve to take 
appropriate actions during this period. The personal and institutional rivalries stressed 
by Milton Friedman and Anna J. Schwartz (1963); the adherence to misleading 
doctrines about how policy actions worked, Calomiris and Wheelock (1998), Meltzer 
(1998); and the weight placed on adherence to the gold standard, Eichengreen (1992) 
undoubtedly were important in producing the lack of response to the crisis exhibited 
by the Federal Reserve. Regional loyalties had declined, in part because World War I 
had boosted nationalism over sectionalism.  
Nevertheless, Figure 5, which focuses on 1929 to 1931, suggests that regional 
differences need to be woven into the traditional story.
7 The deviations among regions 
are striking. In June 1931, almost two years into the Great Depression, the stocks of 
deposits in the San Francisco, Boston, and Philadelphia districts, and in the weighty 
New York district, were still above the June 1929 levels. 
Economists and policymakers from those regions, who tended to look toward 
events in their own region, whether consciously or not, would have been less likely to 
stress the need for drastic countermeasures. As evidence that the need for action was 
recognized by some observers, Friedman and Schwartz (1963, p. 409) cite 
representative Sabbath of Illinois writing to Federal Reserve Board chairman Eugene 
Meyer in January 1931: “Does the board maintain there is no emergency at this time? 
To my mind if ever there was an emergency it is now, and this I feel, no one can 
successfully deny.” Can it be entirely irrelevant that at the time Sabbath was writing 
                                                                                                                                                       
6 All figures are for June dates, usually close to June 30.  30 
deposits had already fallen drastically in the Chicago district and the St. Louis district 
(which covers southern Illinois)? 
  Residence in a district hard hit by deposit losses, it must be admitted, was no 
guaranty of sensitivity to the crisis. James McDougal, President of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Chicago, consistently opposed open market security purchases in 
part because he thought it would be useless for the Federal Reserve to try to offset a 
natural market process: liquidating bad loans. Marriner Eccles, who became chairman 
of the Federal Reserve Board in 1935, might have been expected to be a consistent 
advocate of monetary expansion. He was a banker from the West (Utah), a region 
with a long tradition of monetary radicalism, and one that had been hard hit by the 
Depression as shown in Figure 4.  He had been appointed, moreover, because of his 
sympathy for the New Deal. But his own study of the Depression, and his reading of 
the heretical under-consumptionist William T. Foster, had pushed him toward the 
view that monetary policy was a relatively impotent tool for controlling the economy. 
The real action was on the side of fiscal policy 
  Roy A. Young, President of the Boston Bank, however, at one point based his 
opposition to open market purchases on a regional argument: open market purchases 
would lead to a piling up of reserves in the money centers, with little effect on the 
regions of the country that really needed reserves. Thus, although policy positions in 
the 1930s do not divide as neatly along regional lines as they did in the 1890s, there is 
some evidence that differences in regional perspectives contributed, at least in a small 
measure, to the paralysis that gripped monetary policy making in the early 1930s. 
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The second major policy error during the Depression was the decision by the 
Federal Reserve to raise bank reserve ratios in three steps -- in August 1936, March 
1937, and May 1937. Friedman and  Schwartz (1963), and more recently Meltzer 
(1998), have explored many of the intellectual and personal currents that produced the 
decision. Nevertheless, the diversity in regional experiences shown in Figure 6 is 
suggestive. By June of 1935 the stocks of deposits in the New York, Richmond, and 
San Francisco districts, had all recovered their June 1929 levels. Rapid expansion in 
the ensuing year carried the stocks of deposits in these districts to levels between 20 
and 30 percent above the levels of June 1929. Moreover, employment in these regions 
had also recovered well.
8  A Federal Reserve President in one of these districts, who 
based his conclusions solely on conditions in his own district, might well conclude 
that it was time to adopt a more restrictive monetary policy before things got out of 
hand and inflation threatened.  
In the “heartland” districts, however, conditions were very different. In the 
Cleveland district deposits in June 1935 were little more than 80 percent of what they 
had been in June 1929, and although growth was rapid, deposits were still below the 
June 1929 level in 1936. Unemployment was still high. The president of a district 
bank in the heartland might well conclude that further monetary expansion was 
required. To put it differently, the Federal Reserve, at least to judge by deposit 
grwoth, faced an optimal-currency-area dilemma in 1936. Some regions needed 
stimulation; others needed restraint. 
                                                       
8 It may seem surprising that the Richmond region followed the path of New York and San Francisco. 
In fact, however, as is now well understood, the South did relatively well during the depression.  32 
It is interesting to ask what would have happened had the United States been 
divided into separate currency areas – separate currencies for, say, the East, the South, 
the Middle West, and the Pacific – during the 1930s. Separate currencies, of course, 
were ruled out by political considerations. A currency is a symbol of sovereignty, like 
the flag, and it is as hard to imagine any country deliberately choosing to divide its 
currency. But thinking about separate currencies can throw light on the economics of 
the Depression. Even with separate currencies, monetary policies might well have 
been similar in the East, the South and on the Pacific coast to what they actually were. 
The central bank of the East, for example, would not have acted a lender of last resort 
in the early 1930s, but there would have been no need for it to do so. It would have 
slowed monetary expansion in the mid-1930s, but it would have been logical for it to 
do so.  
The central bank in the Middle West, however, might have acted differently. 
With hundreds of banks failing in the region, with politicians calling for action, a 
central bank that had full responsibility for the region might well have acted as lender 
of last resort in the early 1930s.  Moreover, a Middle Western central bank, under 
intense pressure from local interests, might well have followed a more inflationary 
policy. Silver interests were potent in the Middle West and might well have 
demanded additional purchases of silver financed through an increase in the monetary 
base. The Middle Western currency might well have depreciated relative to other 
regional currencies. But this would have helped employment in the manufacturing 
sectors of the Middle West, which were among the hardest hit in the nation, because  33 
they suffered from increasing labor costs due to unionization, as well as from the 
decrease in demand for consumer durables.  
To be sure, if someone like James McDougal, who advocated deflationary 
measures as President of the Chicago district bank during the 1930s, had been 
president of the Midwestern Central bank that I am imagining, he might have 
succeeded in imposing deflationary policies despite political pressures to do 
otherwise. But not necessarily; the argument that open market purchases were actions 
taken by bankers in faraway places that influenced banks in faraway places would  no 
longer apply. Long experience with the conduct of monetary policy might have made 
central bankers in the Midwest more adroit than central bank board members. In 
short, the monetary union, which in more stable times was a source of strength for the 




  It is generally assumed that the United States became a smoothly functioning 
monetary union, at least for the purpose of comparison with the European Monetary 
Union, in the postwar era. (For example, Feldstein 1997; Wyplosz 1997). The 
comparison may tend to exaggerate how well the U.S. monetary union functions. 
There have been asymmetric real shocks, such as the oil price fluctuations that hit 
Texas particularly hard, or the changes in manufacturing that hit the “rust belt.” 
Perhaps there were regional banking problems that exacerbated these disturbances 
that we have not paid sufficient attention to because we are accustomed to think in 
aggregate terms.  34 
But it is true that several institutional changes took place during the 
Depression and World War II that weakened older divisions. One was the 
development of federally funded transfer programs, such as unemployment insurance, 
social security, and agricultural price supports, which cushioned regional shocks, and 
redistributed reserves lost through interregional payments deficits. Penelope Hartland 
(1949), using data from the Federal Reserve’s Interdistrict Settlement Fund showed 
that the regions that had been hit by terms of trade shocks during the 1930s lost 
reserves to other regions through trade deficits, but that government transfers 
materially offset these losses. Between 1929 and 1933, for example, the Minneapolis 
Federal Reserve district lost $247 million in reserves on private transactions.  This 
was offset, however, by a gain of  $229 million on federal government transactions. 
On the other hand, the Boston Federal Reserve district gained  $644 million in 
reserves on private transactions, while losing  $575 million on federal government 
transactions. (Hartland, 1949, p. 397). Seymour Harris (1957, pp.174-192) noted the 
regional payments problems during the 1930s, and argued that separate currency areas 
would have ameliorated these problems. Harris also noted similar regional payment 
problems in the early post-Second-World-War era.  
A second institutional change was the breakdown of long-term isolation of the 
southern labor market. During the war a strong northern labor market and the absence 
of immigrants pulled workers, white as well as black, from the South, and established 
networks that provided information and support for later migrants. In addition, federal 
labor legislation in the form of minimum wages and regulation of hours and  35 
conditions of work, and federal incentives to mechanize agriculture, established 
during the 1930s added to the postwar flow of migrants from the South.
9 
  A third factor that improved the functioning of the U.S. monetary union after 
the war was the absence of major banking and financial crises emanating from 
regional shocks. Deposit insurance, and monetary policies that reacted quickly to 
economic downturns, tended to minimize the regional banking problems that 
characterized recessions in the prewar era.   
 
  VIII. Lessons from the Troubled History of the U.S. Monetary Union 
Weighing the costs and benefits of monetary unification is a difficult task. On 
the one hand, monetary unification means reduced transaction costs, easier 
comparison of prices in different regions, long-term investment without fears of 
devaluation, and so on. On the other hand, unification means relinquishing the 
capacity to use exchange rate changes and monetary policy to prevent monetary 
problems from magnifying distress originating in other sectors. Frequently, the 
experience of the United States is cited as evidence that in fact the benefits of a 
monetary union greatly outweigh the costs. After all, the monetary union of the 
United States has survived (with a temporary break during the Civil War era) since 
the adoption of the Constitution in 1788. But the survival of the U.S. monetary union 
is at best weak evidence that the net effects have been positive. There are many 
government policies, tariffs for example, which have survived for decades for 
                                                       
9 Fiscal federalism and the improvements in the functioning of the labor market are discussed in 
Eichengreen (1998), chapters 2 and 3. Wright (1996) discusses the breakdown of  barriers to labor 
migration. Libecap (1998) discusses the origins of agricultural price supports.   36 
political reasons, often the support of special interests, even though the claim that 
these policies contributed positively to the general welfare is dubious. 
In truth, the U.S. experience shows that fears about the loss of monetary 
autonomy are far from baseless. American monetary history provides numerous 
examples of regional shocks that were magnified by monetary reactions. Typically, a 
region-specific shock to financial or agricultural markets produced a loss of regional 
bank reserves through an internal drain, caused by fears about the solvency of the 
regional banking system, and an external drain, caused by a regional balance of 
payments deficit. The result would be a regional contraction of bank money and credit 
that would cause headaches even for businesses not effected by the initial shock. A 
political battle would often follow. The regions that had experienced the contraction 
would demand a reform of the whole monetary system. The resulting uncertainty 
about the future of existing monetary institutions would further aggravate the initial 
contraction in economic activity.  
During these episodes the United States might well have been better off, from 
a purely economic point of view, had it been divided into separate currency areas. 
Regions hit by severe asymmetric shocks would have been able to devalue their 
currencies, which would have reduced interregional losses of reserves. Within the 
region, expansionary monetary policies would have shored up the banking system, 
preventing runs or severe contractions of credit. Other regions would have been free 
to follow more conservative monetary policies, eliminating political battles over 
monetary institutions. Separate currencies for separate regions were not ruled out by 
any logical inconsistency. During and after the Civil War (1861-1879) the Pacific  37 
coast had its own currency, the yellowback. But separate currencies for separate 
regions were ruled out eventually by political considerations. In the course of the 
nineteenth century currencies came to be seen as symbols of sovereignty, and separate 
regional currencies became as unthinkable as separate armies.  
Nevertheless, speculating about this counterfactual helps us to understand the 
U.S. business cycle and may suggest some lessons for countries contemplating joining 
or remaining within a monetary union. For a country that is debating whether to join a 
monetary union the lesson is that the facile argument that the United States has had a 
monetary union, and therefore monetary unions must be good things, doesn’t stand 
close scrutiny. Second thoughts are in order.  For countries already firmly committed 
to a monetary union, the lesson is that it is extremely important to adopt the 
institutions adopted by the United States in the 1930s  -- a system of inter-regional 
fiscal transfers and some form of deposit insurance, or regionally sensitive lender-of-
last-resort facilities -- so that asymmetric real shocks are not aggravated by banking 
crises.
10  
Although the Eastern financial centers, and industrial Middle West had been 
integrated by the turn of the century, it was not until the 1930s that all regions, including the 
South, could be said to be parts of a single optimal currency area. How long did it take the 
United States to become an Optimal Currency Area? A reasonable minimum might be one 
hundred and fifty years! Hopefully, it will not take the European Monetary Union quite so 
long.
                                                       
10 Capie (1998) has drawn a similar lesson from a variety of historical examples.  38 
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Table 1. Agricultural Prices and the  NNP Deflator, 1879-1900 
(1879 = 100) 
   
 Net  National 
Product  
Deflator 
Real Price of 
Wheat  
Real  Price of 
Cotton 
1879 100  100  100 
 
1880  110 93 105 
 
1881 108  103  100 
 
1882 112  104  105 
 
1883 110  91  92 
 
1884 105  85  97 
 
1885 98  86  103 
 
1886 96  80  94 
 
1887 97  77  102 
 
1888 99  87  100 
 
1889  100 87 103 
 
1890 98  86  113 
 
1891 97  93  89 
 
1892 93  80  83 
 
1893 95  67  87 
 
1894 89  59  78 
 
1895 88  64  83 
 
1896 85  70  92 
 
1897 86  87  84 
 
1898 88  94  68 
 
1899 91  74  73 
 
1900 95  69  100 
 
 
Sources: NNP deflator: (Friedman and Schwartz, 1982), pp. 122-123. 
Table 4.8, col. 4. Price of wheat and price of cotton: (U.S. Bureau of 
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A Chronology of the U.S. Monetary Union 
 
1788  The Constitution is ratified. States are prohibited from issuing paper 
money. The U.S. monetary union is launched. 
1791  The First Bank of the United States is chartered. 
1811  The First Bank of the United States comes to an end. 
1816  The Second Bank of the United States is chartered. 
1832  President Andrew Jackson vetoes the bill to recharter the Second Bank, 
stressing the oppression of the West in his veto message. 
1836  The Second Bank of the United States comes to an end. 
1837  The nation is hit by a severe banking panic, inaugurating a period of 
hard times.  
1857  The nation is hit by a severe banking panic. Southern firebrands and 
Northern Republicans both make political capital from the crisis. 
1861  The Civil War begins. The United States is divided into three currency 
areas: Greenbacks in the Northeast, Confederate dollars in the South, 
and Gold in California. 
1865  Lee surrenders. The Confederate dollar ceases to function. 
1866  Congress passes the Contraction Act looking to a rapid return to the 
gold standard. 
1873  The silver dollar is omitted from the list of official coins (The Crime of 
1873). National Banks in California are permitted to issue notes backed 
by gold (yellowbacks.) 
1879  Resumption of specie payments. The yellowback and greenback are 
reunited. 
1896  William Jennings Bryan, an advocate of free silver, is nominated by the 
Populists and Democrats; William McKinley, an advocate of 
international bimetallism, is nominated by the Republicans. Bryan 
carries only a few states in the West and South  
1900  The Gold Standard Act firmly commits the United States to the Gold 
Standard and symbolizes the end of the “Battle of the Standards.” 
1907  A Banking Panic leads to the establishment of the National Monetary 
Commission. 
1913  The Federal Reserve System is established. Republican proposals for a 
currency issued by a privately controlled central bank are defeated. 
Instead a federation of regional banks, each issuing their own currency, 
is created. William Jennings Bryan, now secretary of State, plays an 
active role in fashioning the legislation. 
1929-
1931 
Beginning of The Great Contraction. The Stock market crashes and a 
severe monetary contraction begins in the nation’s heartland.  
1936-
1937 
The Federal Reserve raises required reserve ratios contributing to a 
sharp recession that prolongs the depression.  44 
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Figure 4 
Deposits by Federal Reserve District 1922-1941 
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Figure 5
Deposits by Federal Reserve District
The First Two Years of the Depression: 1929-31
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Figure 6
Deposits by Federal Reserve District
Before the Doubling of Reserve Ratios: 1934-36
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Exact figures on the stock of money by region are not available. The amount of coins 
within the United States, for example, can be estimated from figures on minting and 
imports and exports, but the amount within any one region cannot be estimated 
accurately. But figures on deposits, and in some periods bank notes, by place of issue 
(although not by where they are held) are available. Fand (1954, pp. 72-76) estimated 
deposits in Non-national banks in four regions: New England, Middle States, 
Southern States, and Western states for the years 1875-1896. These regions do not 
correspond exactly to economic regions. Perhaps the main problem from this 
perspective is the combination of the Pacific Coast with the other western states. It 
would be, however, extremely time consuming to build up separate estimates for the 
non-national banks for this region, so I have relied on the national bank data to 
provide a picture of the Pacific Coast. To Fand’s estimates of deposits in non-national 
banks, I added deposits of national banks. The source is a table by state that appeared 
regularly in the Annual Report of the Comptroller of the Currency. U.S. Comptroller 
of the Currency (1920, pp. 307-343).  
 
(1) New England: Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode 
Island, and Vermont.  
(2) Middle Atlantic: Delaware, District of Columbia, Maryland, New Jersey, New 
York, and Pennsylvania.  
(3) South: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, 
North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia.  
(4) Middle West: Illinois, Indiana, Indian Territory, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Wisconsin.  
(5) Pacific Coast, Western states, and Territories: Alaska, Arizona, California, 
Colorado, Dakota Territory, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, 
North Dakota, Oregon, Puerto Rico, South Dakota, Utah, Washington, and 
Wyoming. 
 
Deposits: 1896-1914. For this period All Bank Statistics (U.S. Board of Governors, 
1959) gives data for all types of deposits in all classes of banks by states. The data 
shown in the figure are a sum of demand and time deposits. The regions are defined 
above. 
 
Deposits: 1914-1941.  For this period I have switched to Deposits by Federal Reserve 
District because the data is readily available; U.S. Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System (1943, pp. 688-927). 
 
  